# Part of Odoo. See LICENSE file for full copyright and licensing details. import base64 import binascii import hashlib import hmac import pprint from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden from odoo import _, http from odoo.exceptions import ValidationError from odoo.http import request from odoo.tools import py_to_js_locale, urls from odoo.addons.payment import utils as payment_utils from odoo.addons.payment.logging import get_payment_logger from odoo.addons.payment_adyen import utils as adyen_utils _logger = get_payment_logger(__name__) class AdyenController(http.Controller): _webhook_url = '/payment/adyen/notification' @http.route('/payment/adyen/payment_methods', type='jsonrpc', auth='public') def adyen_payment_methods(self, provider_id, formatted_amount=None, partner_id=None): """ Query the available payment methods based on the payment context. :param int provider_id: The provider handling the transaction, as a `payment.provider` id :param dict formatted_amount: The Adyen-formatted amount. :param int partner_id: The partner making the transaction, as a `res.partner` id :return: The JSON-formatted content of the response :rtype: dict """ provider_sudo = request.env['payment.provider'].sudo().browse(provider_id) partner_sudo = partner_id and request.env['res.partner'].sudo().browse(partner_id).exists() # The lang is taken from the context rather than from the partner because it is not required # to be logged in to make a payment, and because the lang is not always set on the partner. # Adyen only supports a limited set of languages but, instead of looking for the closest # match in https://docs.adyen.com/checkout/components-web/localization-components, we simply # provide the lang string as is (after adapting the format) and let Adyen find the best fit. lang_code = py_to_js_locale(request.env.context.get('lang')) or 'en-US' shopper_reference = partner_sudo and f'ODOO_PARTNER_{partner_sudo.id}' partner_country_code = ( partner_sudo.country_id.code or provider_sudo.company_id.country_id.code or 'NL' ) data = { 'merchantAccount': provider_sudo.adyen_merchant_account, 'amount': formatted_amount, 'countryCode': partner_country_code, # ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 (e.g.: 'BE') 'shopperLocale': lang_code, # IETF BCP 47 language tag (e.g.: 'fr-BE') 'shopperReference': shopper_reference, 'channel': 'Web', } response_content = provider_sudo._send_api_request('POST', '/paymentMethods', json=data) response_content['country_code'] = partner_country_code return response_content @http.route('/payment/adyen/payments', type='jsonrpc', auth='public') def adyen_payments( self, provider_id, reference, converted_amount, currency_id, partner_id, payment_method, access_token, browser_info=None ): """Make a payment request and process the payment data. :param int provider_id: The provider handling the transaction, as a `payment.provider` id :param str reference: The reference of the transaction :param int converted_amount: The amount of the transaction in minor units of the currency :param int currency_id: The currency of the transaction, as a `res.currency` id :param int partner_id: The partner making the transaction, as a `res.partner` id :param dict payment_method: The details of the payment method used for the transaction :param str access_token: The access token used to verify the provided values :param dict browser_info: The browser info to pass to Adyen :return: The JSON-formatted content of the response :rtype: dict """ # Check that the transaction details have not been altered. This allows preventing users # from validating transactions by paying less than agreed upon. if not payment_utils.check_access_token( access_token, reference, converted_amount, currency_id, partner_id ): raise ValidationError(_("Received tampered payment request data.")) # Prepare the payment request to Adyen provider_sudo = request.env['payment.provider'].sudo().browse(provider_id).exists() tx_sudo = request.env['payment.transaction'].sudo().search([('reference', '=', reference)]) data = { 'merchantAccount': provider_sudo.adyen_merchant_account, 'amount': { 'value': converted_amount, 'currency': request.env['res.currency'].browse(currency_id).name, # ISO 4217 }, 'reference': reference, 'paymentMethod': payment_method, 'shopperReference': provider_sudo._adyen_compute_shopper_reference(partner_id), 'recurringProcessingModel': 'CardOnFile', # Most susceptible to trigger a 3DS check 'shopperIP': payment_utils.get_customer_ip_address(), 'shopperInteraction': 'Ecommerce', 'shopperEmail': tx_sudo.partner_email or "", 'shopperName': adyen_utils.format_partner_name(tx_sudo.partner_name), 'telephoneNumber': tx_sudo.partner_phone or "", 'storePaymentMethod': tx_sudo.tokenize, # True by default on Adyen side 'authenticationData': { 'threeDSRequestData': { 'nativeThreeDS': 'preferred', } }, 'channel': 'web', # Required to support 3DS 'origin': provider_sudo.get_base_url(), # Required to support 3DS 'browserInfo': browser_info, # Required to support 3DS 'returnUrl': urls.urljoin( provider_sudo.get_base_url(), # Include the reference in the return url to be able to match it after redirection. # The key 'merchantReference' is chosen on purpose to be the same as that returned # by the /payments endpoint of Adyen. f'/payment/adyen/return?merchantReference={reference}', ), **adyen_utils.include_partner_addresses(tx_sudo), } # Force the capture delay on Adyen side if the provider is not configured for capturing # payments manually. This is necessary because it's not possible to distinguish # 'AUTHORISATION' events sent by Adyen with the merchant account's capture delay set to # 'manual' from events with the capture delay set to 'immediate' or a number of hours. If # the merchant account is configured to capture payments with a delay but the provider is # not, we force the immediate capture to avoid considering authorized transactions as # captured on Odoo. if not provider_sudo.capture_manually: data.update(captureDelayHours=0) # Send the payment request to Adyen. idempotency_key = payment_utils.generate_idempotency_key( tx_sudo, scope='payment_request_controller' ) response_content = provider_sudo._send_api_request( 'POST', '/payments', json=data, idempotency_key=idempotency_key ) tx_sudo._process( 'adyen', dict(response_content, merchantReference=reference), # Match the transaction ) return response_content @http.route('/payment/adyen/payments/details', type='jsonrpc', auth='public') def adyen_payment_details(self, provider_id, reference, payment_details): """Submit the details of the additional actions and process the payment data. The additional actions can have been performed both from the inline form or during a redirection. :param int provider_id: The provider handling the transaction, as a `payment.provider` id :param str reference: The reference of the transaction :param dict payment_details: The details of the additional actions performed for the payment :return: The JSON-formatted content of the response :rtype: dict """ # Make the payment details request to Adyen provider_sudo = request.env['payment.provider'].browse(provider_id).sudo() response_content = provider_sudo._send_api_request( 'POST', '/payments/details', json=payment_details ) # Process the payment data request response. request.env['payment.transaction'].sudo()._process( 'adyen', dict(response_content, merchantReference=reference), # Match the transaction ) return response_content @http.route('/payment/adyen/return', type='http', auth='public', csrf=False, save_session=False) def adyen_return_from_3ds_auth(self, **data): """ Process the authentication data sent by Adyen after redirection from the 3DS1 page. The route is flagged with `save_session=False` to prevent Odoo from assigning a new session to the user if they are redirected to this route with a POST request. Indeed, as the session cookie is created without a `SameSite` attribute, some browsers that don't implement the recommended default `SameSite=Lax` behavior will not include the cookie in the redirection request from the payment provider to Odoo. As the redirection to the '/payment/status' page will satisfy any specification of the `SameSite` attribute, the session of the user will be retrieved and with it the transaction which will be immediately post-processed. :param dict data: The authentication result data. May include custom params sent to Adyen in the request to allow matching the transaction when redirected here. """ # Retrieve the transaction based on the reference included in the return url tx_sudo = request.env['payment.transaction'].sudo()._search_by_reference('adyen', data) if not tx_sudo: return request.redirect('/payment/status') # Overwrite the operation to force the flow to 'redirect'. This is necessary because even # though Adyen is implemented as a direct payment provider, it will redirect the user out # of Odoo in some cases. For instance, when a 3DS1 authentication is required, or for # special payment methods that are not handled by the drop-in (e.g. Sofort). tx_sudo.operation = 'online_redirect' # Query and process the result of the additional actions that have been performed _logger.info( "Handling redirection from Adyen for transaction %s with data:\n%s", tx_sudo.reference, pprint.pformat(data) ) self.adyen_payment_details( tx_sudo.provider_id.id, data['merchantReference'], { 'details': { 'redirectResult': data['redirectResult'], }, }, ) # Redirect the user to the status page return request.redirect('/payment/status') @http.route(_webhook_url, type='http', methods=['POST'], auth='public', csrf=False) def adyen_webhook(self): """ Process the data sent by Adyen to the webhook based on the event code. See https://docs.adyen.com/development-resources/webhooks/understand-notifications for the exhaustive list of event codes. :return: The '[accepted]' string to acknowledge the notification :rtype: str """ data = request.get_json_data() for notification_item in data['notificationItems']: payment_data = notification_item['NotificationRequestItem'] _logger.info( "notification received from Adyen with data:\n%s", pprint.pformat(payment_data) ) # Check the integrity of the notification. tx_sudo = request.env['payment.transaction'].sudo()._search_by_reference( 'adyen', payment_data ) if tx_sudo: self._verify_signature(payment_data, tx_sudo) # Check whether the event of the notification succeeded and reshape the notification # data for parsing success = payment_data['success'] == 'true' event_code = payment_data['eventCode'] if event_code == 'AUTHORISATION' and success: payment_data['resultCode'] = 'Authorised' elif event_code == 'CANCELLATION': payment_data['resultCode'] = 'Cancelled' if success else 'Error' elif event_code in ['REFUND', 'CAPTURE']: payment_data['resultCode'] = 'Authorised' if success else 'Error' elif event_code == 'CAPTURE_FAILED' and success: # The capture failed after a capture notification with success = True was sent payment_data['resultCode'] = 'Error' else: continue # Don't handle unsupported event codes and failed events tx_sudo._process('adyen', payment_data) return request.make_json_response('[accepted]') # Acknowledge the notification @staticmethod def _verify_signature(payment_data, tx_sudo): """Check that the received signature matches the expected one. :param dict payment_data: The payment data containing the received signature. :param payment.transaction tx_sudo: The sudoed transaction referenced by the payment data. :return: None :raise Forbidden: If the signatures don't match. """ # Retrieve the received signature from the payload received_signature = payment_data.get('additionalData', {}).get('hmacSignature') if not received_signature: _logger.warning("received payment data with missing signature") raise Forbidden() # Compare the received signature with the expected signature computed from the payload hmac_key = tx_sudo.provider_id.adyen_hmac_key expected_signature = AdyenController._compute_signature(payment_data, hmac_key) if not hmac.compare_digest(received_signature, expected_signature): _logger.warning("received payment data with invalid signature") raise Forbidden() @staticmethod def _compute_signature(payload, hmac_key): """ Compute the signature from the payload. See https://docs.adyen.com/development-resources/webhooks/verify-hmac-signatures :param dict payload: The notification payload :param str hmac_key: The HMAC key of the provider handling the transaction :return: The computed signature :rtype: str """ def _flatten_dict(_value, _path_base='', _separator='.'): """ Recursively generate a flat representation of a dict. :param Object _value: The value to flatten. A dict or an already flat value :param str _path_base: They base path for keys of _value, including preceding separators :param str _separator: The string to use as a separator in the key path """ if isinstance(_value, dict): # The inner value is a dict, flatten it _path_base = _path_base if not _path_base else _path_base + _separator for _key in _value: yield from _flatten_dict(_value[_key], _path_base + str(_key)) else: # The inner value cannot be flattened, yield it yield _path_base, _value def _to_escaped_string(_value): """ Escape payload values that are using illegal symbols and cast them to string. String values containing `\\` or `:` are prefixed with `\\`. Empty values (`None`) are replaced by an empty string. :param Object _value: The value to escape :return: The escaped value :rtype: string """ if isinstance(_value, str): return _value.replace('\\', '\\\\').replace(':', '\\:') elif _value is None: return '' else: return str(_value) signature_keys = [ 'pspReference', 'originalReference', 'merchantAccountCode', 'merchantReference', 'amount.value', 'amount.currency', 'eventCode', 'success' ] # Flatten the payload to allow accessing inner dicts naively flattened_payload = {k: v for k, v in _flatten_dict(payload)} # Build the list of signature values as per the list of required signature keys signature_values = [flattened_payload.get(key) for key in signature_keys] # Escape values using forbidden symbols escaped_values = [_to_escaped_string(value) for value in signature_values] # Concatenate values together with ':' as delimiter signing_string = ':'.join(escaped_values) # Convert the HMAC key to the binary representation binary_hmac_key = binascii.a2b_hex(hmac_key.encode('ascii')) # Calculate the HMAC with the binary representation of the signing string with SHA-256 binary_hmac = hmac.new(binary_hmac_key, signing_string.encode('utf-8'), hashlib.sha256) # Calculate the signature by encoding the result with Base64 return base64.b64encode(binary_hmac.digest()).decode()